route. Hither to we have also assumed that the most effective method of ensuring a favourable atmosphere in 1932 would be by means of such preliminary flights as those now proposed. (2) High Commissioner for Iraq has just reported telegraphically that the German Junkers Company, who are already operating between Tehran and Bagdad, desire, in order convey pilgrims by air between Kerbela and Mecca next season, to form subsidiary company. Attitude to be adopted by His Majesty's Government and Iraqi government towards this proposal is not likely to be favourable, but it is possible that Junkers will approach Hejazi government through German government direct with request for permission for service in Arabia, irrespective of attitude of His Majesty's and Iraq Governments as regards Iraq. Bin Saud's granting permission would involve first air service in Arabia being instituted by foreign rather than British aircraft, with consequent injury to British prestige, while refusal would probably be quoted by him as precedent for refusal of future British requests. It is therefore desirable that if possible, His Majesty's Government should take action with Hejazi government before any move by Junkers is made. (3) American oil interests have approached both Imperial airways and Junkers as regards possible aerial geological survey over country between Bahrein and Koweit extending to 100 or 200 miles inland. If approached by Imperial Airways it may be difficult for His Majesty's Government to refuse to ask Hejazi government for permission since Junkers will no doubt do so through German government. Although these flights would be undertaken by civil aircraft, it seems possible that request for permission for inland flight of this type may be even more inopportune than one for direct coastal flight by Service aircraft, and if made first have even worse reaction on main scheme. (4) While force of your argument regarding suspicions of Bin Saud that His Majesty's Government are trying to interfere in Hejaz air force affairs is appreciated, Air Ministry consider that condition of that force in a period of 12 months may have deteriorated owing to lack of facilities for renewals and repairs. If serious deterioration in effeciency of air force shall take place, atmosphere for obtaining our desiderata may be even more unfavourable than at present. (5) Ibn Saud will presumably shortly leave for Nejd and not return to Hejaz till next year. This may either involve dangerously long postponement of question, or difficult negotiation by correspondence, which might offer greater scope for misunderstanding than personal conversation now. (6) Pearling season offers valid and convenient reason for suggesting special service. Once it is over, permission could probably only be asked on general grounds which might be more difficult to justify. In these circumstances, with a view to obtaining more definite indications of their probable reactions might it not be desirable and possible to sound Hejazi government or the King informally, without putting forward any definite proposal? It seems that since 1927 general question has not been broached with them directly. We recognize on the other hand that it might be better to abandon idea of pearling flights altogether, and reserve for determined effort our energies next year to secure general permission for flights in connexion with Indian air route. Were this request made once it would have to be pressed, and it is arguable that it is better not to dissipate our energies in advance. You may use your discretion in taking before King’s departure any action that seems to you desirable. Please report fully by telegram. <National Archives of India Identifier PR_000004001336>
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