THE PERSIAN AIR MAIL Diplomatic, Political and Postal History
THE PERSIAN AIR MAIL Diplomatic, Political and Postal History Lawrence Bestow has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work.
INTRODUCTION Air Communications in the Persian Gulf. (Communicated by the British Air Ministry.) The necessity for an organised air route for British aircraft, both Service and Civil, to connect Egypt and Iraq with India, has long been realised; and the negotiations and technical preparations necessary to this end have been proceeding ever since the end of the Great War, though not without numerous difficulties and delays. It is practicable to organise an air route along either shore of the Gulf. The route along the Persian shore is the better, since the Arabian shore route includes an oversea flight of some 226 miles. The latter route also entails the use of landing grounds on the Hasa and Trucial coasts, and on this account, under the conditions obtaining at the present time, would afford less security for passengers and aircraft than the Persian route. These conditions, however, may be expected to improve. Though the Persian route is the better for a regular civil passenger air service, the Arabian shore route, whether ultimately used as a civil air route or not, is required as a strategic air route for Service aircraft which might be unable by reason of Persian neutrality to use the Persian route. The history of the development of these two routes is related in the following paragraphs. The Air Route along the Persian Shore. Flights along the route. The first flight between Iraq and India along this route took place in December 1918, and was carried out by a Service aircraft of the Royal Air Force. The Persian Government had at that time little control of their coast line, and the question of obtaining permission for the flight did not then arise. The landing grounds which were required for this flight, were prepared by Royal Air Force personnel, and are those which have been used up to the present time (1928). This route was followed in 1919 by the pioneer long-distance flights to the East, and in 1920 a Flight of Royal Air Force aircraft from Iraq was based at Bushire to assist the British Resident in the maintenance of order. This Flight was withdrawn in the autumn of 1921 when it became necessary to concentrate all available aircraft in Iraq. Since that date the air route along the Persian shore has been used at irregular intervals by both British and foreign aircraft. Several flights have been carried out by Service aircraft of the Royal Air Force, but most of the flights have been by civil aircraft. The Association of the Government of India with the route. The following extracts from the memorandum by the Indian Air Board, prepared in 1926, entitled “The Past History and Future Development of Civil Aviation in India”, describe the association of the Indian Government with the Persian route along the Gulf:— “The question of linking India with the outer world by a line of air communications was first raised in June 1919, when a scheme was put forward by the Air Ministry for the establishment of an air service between Cairo and Karachi. The objects of this scheme were mainly military, though the carriage of mails was also contemplated. The Government of India supported the proposals, and, on the understanding that a weekly service would be instituted, agreed to provide and maintain the necessary aerodromes and buildings from Karachi to Bushire, at an estimated cost of Rs. 13¼ lakhs initial and Rs. 36,000 recurring. The British Government were to be responsible for providing the necessary machines, the pay and maintenance of the unit, the cost of flying and any other liabilities. It was considered at the time that Karachi must eventually be the aerial gateway of India, and it was realised that, even should the proposed service not be a success, Government would have a permanent asset in
the aerodromes and buildings there, upon which it was anticipated that some 80 per cent, of their contribution would be spent. Before, however, any action was taken in the matter, the British Government decided to abandon the proposal for the carriage of mails by the suggested service. It would, they decided, be preferable to deal with the scheme as a military proposition, pure and simple, leaving the question of the inauguration of a civil mail service for separate consideration. As it had, in the meantime, been decided independently, as part of the Royal Air Force organisation, to establish an aircraft depot at Karachi, the only extra expenditure involved in the proposal in which, on the analogy of the previous arrangements, India was interested, was that to be incurred at Bushire, Bunder Abbas, and Charbar, estimated, on the reduced scale possible owing to the less ambitious nature of the scheme, to cost about Rs. 1 lakh. The Government of India agreed, as with other similar charges in Persia, to bear half this expenditure. But the military service has never, in fact, been extended to India; it has been confined to the section Cairo-Baghdad, and consequently the anticipated expenditure upon the Persian Gulf aerodromes has not been incurred. The proposed civil mail service over the route was the subject of discussion between the British and Indian Governments in 1920, and the latter, although they were, in the conditions then obtaining, somewhat sceptical of its prospects of success, declared themselves ready, if the scheme matured, to adhere to the undertaking which they had given in the previous year, which involved their bearing the whole cost of the depot at Karachi and half that of the three principal aerodromes in the Persian Gulf . They also offered to guarantee a sum of Rs. 1 lakh per annum for three years towards the deficit in the working of the mail service. This offer was, however, never accepted, as, owing to unsettled conditions in Arabia and Mesopotamia, the whole proposal was dropped. It was, however, realised that, even in the absence of such a service, India had a genuine interest in the upkeep of a connecting link, for use when necessary, between the Middle East and Karachi, and in 1921 Government agreed and have continued to make a small contribution to the maintenance of the aerodromes at Bushire, Bunder Abbas, and Charbar, equivalent to half the actual expenditure upon them, limited to £850 for capital and £100 for annual recurring charges. This, together with a similar contribution from the British Government, has sufficed for the provision of absolutely essential facilities in the shape of godowns, &c., for the repairs periodically required, and for the pay of the necessary watch and ward establishment.” The attitude of Persia towards the use of the route by a regular Civil Air Service. Persia adhered to the International Convention for Air Navigation in 1920, the Persian Minister in Paris being instructed by his Government to notify the Government of the French Republic of the adherence, at the same time stating that the Persian Government “reserves the right to prepare as and when it becomes possible the means and the new organisations which the execution of the clauses of the said Convention necessitate.” Although the Mejlis has, however, never officially ratified this adherence, Persia has sent official representatives to many of the meetings of the International Commission for Air Navigation and has paid almost up-to-date her contributions towards the expenses of the Commission. Consequently, there would appear to be no doubt that Persia is in fact a party to the International Air Convention of 1919. Persia, however, has done little towards taking steps to give effect to her adherence to the Convention either in the direction of ground organisation or of air regulations. However, in connection with the fulfilment of her obligations she proceeded to give general notification of certain routes through her territory along which flying could take place. At our request the route along the Persian shore of the Gulf was included in the possible routes. Objection has never been taken by Persia to individual flights of civil aircraft over her territory, but she has taken exception to the operation by Imperial Airways Limited, of a regular service along the Persian Gulf, though at a later date she offered to allow the operation of a service along one of the other notified routes through Central Persia. During 1925 a fortnightly civil air service between Cairo and Karachi, to be operated by Imperial Airways, Limited, was projected. The use, for this service, of a route through Central Persia was considered, but owing to the difficulty and expense of supplying landing grounds with fuel and stores this route was not considered practicable. Negotiations were opened with the Persian Government, who agreed that representatives of the Air Ministry and of Imperial Airways, Limited, should fly
along the Gulf in a service aircraft of the Royal Air Force to investigate local conditions. This reconnaissance was carried out in the autumn of 1925, and in September of that year Air Vice-Marshal Sir Sefton Brancker, the Director of Civil Aviation, visited Tehran with a view to assisting the British Minister, Sir Percy Loraine, in arranging an agreement for the service with the Persian Government. A satisfactory agreement was concluded in less than a week, largely owing to the cordial relations existing between Riza Khan (then Prime Minister of Persia) and Sir Percy Loraine. The Persian representatives reaffirmed their desire to conform to the terms of the International Air Convention. They were very definite in their view that the ground organisation of the route must be Persian, but indicated that it was impossible for Persia to contribute towards the cost of it. Notes were exchanged in which it was agreed (subject to ratification by the Mejlis of the International Air Convention) to allow Imperial Airways Limited, to operate a fortnightly service, the British Government undertaking to provide any sheds, buildings and wireless equipment necessary. These items were to become Persian property when completed, with the exception of the wireless equipment, which was to be sold to Persia on a basis of periodic payments. It was indicated during these negotiations that the Persians were ready within their limitations to give effect to their obligations under the Convention to afford liberty of innocent passage across their territory and to provide facilities therefor. The ratification by the Mejlis of the Convention, however, was deferred through 1926 in spite of the endeavours of the British Minister, and this fact was used as a pretext for withholding permission for the operation of the service by Imperial Airways between Basrah and Karachi. Meanwhile, work on the organisation of the route began; measures were taken for the erection of huts and the installation of petrol tanks; and wireless equipment was delivered. In December 1926 the Persian Government gave orders that work on the ground organisation of the route must cease and that the service could not be permitted. In January 1927 Air Vice-Marshal Sir Sefton Brancker again visited Tehran, where Sir Robert Clive had just arrived as British Minister. Conferences were held and promises were made that the Convention would be ratified at an early date. Subsequently, however, it became clear that the Persian Government had in fact at that time no intention of carrying out their agreement. It would appear that their attitude was due to three reasons:— (i) The route would be of no great value to Persia herself. (ii) The Persian Government did not wish the route to be administered by foreigners and feared the responsibility and cost of administering it themselves. (iii) The Persian Government were afraid that the regular operation of a British civil air service would increase British influence in the Persian Gulf. The discussion reached a deadlock, which persisted until it became possible to bring pressure to bear on the Persians to reopen the negotiations under the terms of the new treaty with Persia concluded in the spring of the present year (1928). Following on a visit to Tehran by the General Manager of Imperial Airways, Limited, in June 1928, the Persian Government has agreed to allow the Company as from January 1929 to operate a limited service along the route, using only Bushire and Jask as aerodromes and Lengeh as an emergency landing ground. The Persian Government have said, categorically, that permission will not be renewed after a period of three years has expired, which in their opinion should allow the Company time to study the possibilities of operating a Central Persian route through Tehran, the route which they wish followed. The Persian Government also insist on retaining the ground organisation for the three years’ service along the Persian Gulf in their own hands, including the provision of petrol installations and the provision and operation of the wireless service. This offer, which has several very undesirable restrictions attaching to it, is now receiving the consideration of the Air Ministry and Imperial Airways, Limited. The Air Route along the Arabian Shore. It is desired for this air route to establish refuelling grounds at intervals of about 200 miles and emergency landing grounds at intervals of 30-50 miles. It would not be necessary normally for aircraft to refuel at all these landing grounds, but at certain times of year strong adverse winds are encountered in these regions and may make an intermediate landing necessary for fuel. The route is described below by sections. At the present time flights have only been made over the Kuwait and
Hasa sections between Iraq and Bahrein. These sections have not yet been reconnoitred on the ground, and the ground reconnaissance of several of the other sections has not yet been completed. Kuwait Section.—Kuwait has been visited by Royal Air Force service aircraft at intervals since 1920, and a landing ground near the town is in existence. In 1920 the Shaikh of Kuwait asked for help in the defence of his territory against the Akhwan. Two aircraft were accordingly despatched to drop leaflets on the Akhwan, warning them that offensive action would be taken against them if they made any attempt to attack the town. This had the desired effect. In 1924, when a Royal Air Force aircraft returning from a flight to Bahrein had made a forced landing some distance away on the Kuwait coastline, the Shaikh lent his own cars and staff to go out to its relief. In the present year (1928), the Shaikh of Kuwait again asked for our assistance against a threatened Akhwan attack, and a flight of aircraft and section of armoured cars were sent to Kuwait. No Akhwan attack, however, was made. Hasa Section.—The reconnaissance of the Hasa coast section has had to be postponed again and again owing to difficulty in obtaining sanction from Ibn Saud. One refuelling ground in the neighbourhood of Ras-as-Safaniyah and two emergency landing grounds are required. In order that our request might be presented in the most favourable light, the opportunity was awaited of the visit of Sir Gilbert Clayton to Ibn Saud in May 1927. In reply to our request to carry out the reconnaissance, Ibn Saud asked for more complete information, and it was explained to him through His Britannic Majesty’s Consul at Jeddah that we required to make a reconnaissance, on the ground only, for the purpose of selecting sites for landing grounds, and that aircraft would not use these landing grounds until his agreement had been obtained. Delay ensued, however, in view of the wish expressed by Ibn Saud to send a representative to Hasa to ascertain the local conditions before acceding to our request. His Britannic Majesty’s Consul at Jeddah was of the opinion that at this time Ibn Saud was not unfavourably disposed towards the project for an air route; but was actuated by genuine anxiety for the safety of the reconnaissance party in Hasa. Four months later, in September 1927, a reply was received from Ibn Saud to the effect that he could not sanction the reconnaissance owing to the attitude of the Hasa tribes, whose suspicions had been aroused by the establishment of military posts in the southern desert of Iraq. Thereafter, it was the intention that the British Resident, Bushire, should endeavor to obtain permission, and he was instructed to raise the question on the occasion of his projected interview with Ibn Saud in regard to the Akhwan raid on Busaiyah police post in Iraq in November 1927. This interview, however, did not take place. Since that date the Akhwan situation has prevented any further representations being made to Ibn Saud; and no favourable opportunity occurred for the reopening of the subject during the recent conversations in June 1928 between Sir Gilbert Clayton and Ibn Saud. Bahrein.—No flights were made to Bahrein prior to 1924. Early in that year, in view of the interest aroused locally by the purchase of some foreign aircraft by the Persian Government, the British Resident at Bahrein requested that a flight of service aircraft should visit the island for the purpose of “showing the flag.” A Royal Air Force ground reconnaissance party was sent to the island and a landing ground selected, and in May 1924 a flight of Royal Air Force service aircraft flew from Iraq to Bahrein and made several flights over the island. Sheikh Mahommed of Bahrein was flown and the visit of the aircraft met with a most friendly reception. Ibn Saud objected to this flight on the ground that it caused consternation among his subjects. A reply was sent to the effect that the aircraft did not fly over his territory, but along the coastline, that being the most direct route between Kuwait and Bahrein. No further flights over these sections were made until 1927, when the journey was twice flown by civil aircraft of Imperial Airways, Limited. On the first of these occasions a Shaikh Abdul Rahman Qasaibi, who had represented himself as being one of the principal advisers to Ibn Saud, was carried. It transpired later, however, that this Shaikh had formed an exaggerated view of his own position, and that in giving permission for the flight he had acted without authority. On the occasion of the second flight permission was not sought and the aircraft flew a course outside territorial waters. At about this time (August 1927) enquiries were made of Imperial Airways, Limited, with a view to the operation of a fortnightly flight from Bahrein to Basrah for the transport of pearls. Although this project was abandoned, it is an indication of one of the uses which a civil air route down the Arabian shore could serve. Summary.—As regards the sections between Iraq and Bahrein the present position is therefore that one refuelling ground and two emergency landing grounds have still to be selected before this part of the route can be regarded as fully satisfactory; and arrangements have still to be concluded with Ibn
Saud for the carrying out of this reconnaissance, and for the use of the route. Aircraft, however, have already flown between Koweit and Bahrein without requiring to make an intermediate landing. Sections from Bahrein to Muscat.—In March 1927 a Royal Air Force ground reconnaissance party visited these sections. All the sites required for refueling grounds were reconnoitred and selected. That is to say, Yas Island, Abu Dhabi, Al Auhi and Muscat. Of the emergency grounds required, however, it was only possible, owing to the attitude of the minor Shaikhs, to select definitely those in the Batina section (towards Muscat). Attitude of the minor Shaikhs.—The Shaikhs whose authority lies mainly on the coastline and does not extend inland, e.g. the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, and those in the Batina section, which includes Al Auhi, are under British influence and are at the mercy of any action we might take from the sea. The few inhabitants of Yas Island were also found friendly, and no difficulty, therefore, should arise in establishing the landing grounds required at Yas Island, Abu Dhabi, and in the Batina section. The attitude of the Sultan of Muscat has throughout been most friendly. The Shaikhs, however, whose territory extends further inland are naturally more at the mercy of Ibn Sand and have accepted Wahabism to a greater extent. Thus, the Shaikh of Qatar was opposed to the establishment of a landing ground in his territory, stating to the reconnaissance party that it would place him in great difficulty with the subjects of Ibn Saud, who visited his port in considerable numbers. In regard to his objection, however, it was observed by the British Resident at Bushire that these difficulties might not be found to be insuperable, but might be surmounted by a financial arrangement. The Bariami Shaikh (Oman section) definitely barred the progress of the reconnaissance party, stating that the country belonged to Ibn Saud; and in spite of every effort by the British Wazir of Muscat who accompanied the party, refused to grant permission to proceed and obliged the party to turn northward out of his country to Sharjah. Summary.—On these sections, therefore, between Bahrein and Muscat, the present position (1928) is that the refuelling grounds required have been reconnoitred but the intermediate emergency landing grounds have for the most part not yet been reconnoitred ; and it is necessary to arrange for the completion of the reconnaissance and the use of the route. Baluchistan Section.—From Muscat this route leaves the Arabian shore and crosses by a sea flight of 226 miles to the Baluchistan coast at Gwadar. No difficulties are anticipated in regard to facilities on the Baluchistan section. The Government of India have already agreed to provide a landing ground near Pasni. Air Ministry, 23rd August 1928. https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100029571336.0x000006
Before the 1920s Persia was largely untouched by the enormous changes being introduced by the aviation industry. There were however a few visitors. 1877 In his diary, Nasser al-Din Shah records the flight of two balloons in Tehran. <Picture fromWikipedia> 1891 Prince Malkum Khan Nazim al-Dawla brought a balloon from France, which he flew near Tehran. Following protests from religious scholars the flights were halted. <’Atrvash, 1386> 1910 12 November 1910 “Flight” reports that a 50-h.p. Blériot-Gnome flown by M. Prier was the first of its kind to be sold on the ground of the London Aerodrome, and the first in existence to be purchased for a purely commercial reason, since it was purchased in connection with the laying of oil pipes across a desert in Persia. 1913 In 1913, the people of Tehran saw for the first time an aeroplane flying over the city. All across the city, astounded people rushed outside to get a closer look at the strange bird. The aeroplane landed in the city centre at the Cossack Division exercise field known as Meidan-e-Mashgh. On landing, it was slightly damaged by the barrel of a cannon on the ground. This aeroplane, a Bleriot XI, was flown into Tehran from Russia by Kuzminski, a Russian pilot. The aircraft was repaired with the assistance of Iranian army technicians and then flew back to Russia. http://www.iranchamber.com/history/articles/history_iranian_air_transportation_industry. php Other sources state that Kuzminski was Polish and that his flight to Tehran took place on 6th Safar 1332 – 4th January 1914. “Flight” reports that on 12 January 1914, Kuzminski flew his Blériot-Gnome from Kasra-Kadjar to Teheran, where he flew before the Shah and other members of the Imperial family. On the day following Kuzminski’s landing, Ahmad Shah was photographed with the aeroplane.
1916 A twin-engined aeroplane arrived, together with a circus group, in Rescht from Russia. <‘Atrvash, 1386> 1917 5 September 1917 The route via Russia: Manchester – Petrograd – Baku - Meched 1918 Major General Sir Geoffrey Salmond, GOC RAF Middle East; Brigadier Borton and Captain Ross Smith flew a Handley Page bomber from Cairo (29 November 1918) - Damascus – Ramadi – Baghdad (arrived 30 November 1918) – Bushire (arrived 5 December 1918) – Bandar Abbas – Chahbar (arrived 7 December 1918, departed 10 December 1918). At least one postcard was picked up at Chahbar (addressed to Karachi). At Karachi on 10 December 1918, 43 letters were handed to the Postmaster for onward delivery. The flight continued to Delhi (12 December 1918) and Calcutta (17 December 1918). http://www.japhila.cz/hof/0630/index0630_004.htm Other sources give slightly different dates and state that Bandar Abbas was reached on 6 December 1918, where the starboard wheel was damaged. The necessary repair delayed departure from Bandar Abbas until 9 December 1918, when they left Bandar Abbas and reached Chahbar that same day. 1919 13 January 1919 The aircraft HMA Old Carthusian left Martlesham Heath (England) on 13 December 1918 on the first through flight to India. The crew were Major Archibald S.C. Maclaren, Captain Robert Halley (co-pilot), Sgt. A.E.S. Smith, Sgt. William Crockett and Sgt. Thomas Brown. Commander in Chief of RAF India, General Norman D.K. MacEwan, was
a passenger. The route was Martlesham Heath – Bourget – Centcelli Rome – Otranto – Malta – Mersa Matru – Heliopolis – Baghdad – El Amara – Ahwaz – Bushire - Bandar Abbas. At Ahwaz mail (cancelled Base Post Office MEF 10 Jan 19) was picked up. No mail is known from Bushire, which was reached on 11 January 1919. After landing at Bandar Abbas on 12 January 1919, and collecting a small mail, HMA Old Carthusian took off on 13 January 1919 for Jask. After a forced landing at Omara, Major Maclaren and mails were transferred to HMS Britomart by which they arrived in Karachi on 16 January 1919. One of the few covers known from this flight is addressed to Major General Sir Percy Cox in Teheran. Like other covers it has a three-line cachet “FIRST THROUGH AERIAL MAIL/ GREAT BRITAIN TO INDIA/ KARACHI 14.1.1919”. The cachet was applied at the British Embassy in Bandar Abbas. The “14” of the date was amended in manuscript to “17”. <Pradip Jain, London Philatelist, September 2015> 16 April 1919 Report from Lt.-Col. A. T. Wilson, Officiating Civil Commissioner: Ref: IOR/L/PS/18/B320 The Use of Aeroplanes in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf. Note by Lieut.-Col. A. T. WILSON, Civil Commissioner, Baghdad. Part I.—South-West Persia. 1. The Deputy Political Resident, Bushire, recently addressed the Government of India suggesting that the controlling authorities in Shiraz would be more effectively supported throughout the Province by the presence of aeroplanes than by expensive Persian gendarmerie of doubtful calibre, and urged that the general question of aviation in Persia should be taken into active consideration with a view to presenting the Persian Government, with the least possible delay, with an effective force capable of immediate utilisation, thus curtailing as far as possible the stay of our military forces in South-West Persia, where they have been off and on for the past four years at enormous expense engaged principally in maintaining order on behalf of the Persian Government.
2. The Government of India replied as follows:— "The possible introduction of aviation in operations in Persia has been under consideration for some time: problem, however, is attended with serious difficulty. Owing to absence of motor roads and roughness of the country, the aeroplanes used would have to have wide radius of action, and recovery of any obliged to make a forced landing would be generally impossible. Aviation in Southern Persia, therefore, would be attended with considerable danger. Indeed, it is only with use of latest pattern of aeroplane that it would be feasible at all. It would for similar reasons be highly expensive, especially as it is against present policy to train other than British personnel to aviation work. To use of aviation as a permanent instrument for police work in peace time in Southern Persia, there are additional and still more weighty objections: the impossibility, for instance, of discrimination between innocent and guilty in carrying out punitive measures by aeroplane, and necessity of protection and support by regular troops which would mean the permanent location of regular garrisons in several posts in Bushire hinterland. Latter consideration alone precludes aviation being (to quote your words) presented to Persian Government as an effective force capable of being utilised immediately and curtailing as far as possible the stay of our troops in the country." 3. It seemed clear from this reply that the Government of India has not adequately appreciated the very great practical and moral value of aeroplanes—for which General Officer Commanding, Bushire, has been pressing for months past; and both I and my deputy urged on Major-General Salmond the importance of pressing for their despatch (they could have been spared for months past from Mesopotamia). This he was successful in doing, and on return from a visit by air to Bushire with the flight despatched thither, I telegraphed to the India Office as follows — "I submit for consideration of His Majesty's Government that question, which I regard as of vital importance and as likely to modify our future dispositions in Persia, should not be regarded as being disposed of by foregoing pronouncement. " For past six months we have maintained from Baghdad a flight of aeroplanes at Kasvin whose radius of action has extended to Senna, Urumia, Tabriz and Baku. This work has been carried on at a great personal risk to pilots with machines not the latest pattern. Now, however, the best machines are available. The flight now at Mosul is in a position to control Sulaimaniyah, Rowanduz, Zakho, and places even further distant. "Landing grounds have been prepared at every town of importance in occupied territories between Baghdad and Baku, Arabistan, on oil fields and at Tehran. "Stores of petrol and oil are maintained at every place at which a Political Officer is stationed. I have every confidence in ability of Royal Air Force to lend powerful aid to civil power in maintenance of order in Mesopotamia and in North-West Persia without the intervention of troops. They should be in a position in future to do for us on land in Middle East what the Navy have done for us in Persian Gulf in past. “Our experience in Mesopotamia and in North-West Persia does not bear out the view that discrimination between innocent and guilty is more difficult when carried out by Royal Air Force than by troops, and I have little doubt that it will prove far less costly than our present methods. "Aeroplanes are now being used with success in connection with operations of Bushire Expeditionary Force; it can scarcely be doubted that, had they been made available two years ago, the present situation in Fars would never have arisen. "If I may express a personal opinion, the establishment of works and hangars at Bushire, combined with landing grounds at all principal towns, and petrol stores at all places where British of officials are posted in South Persia, would go far towards solving the problem. “It will be borne in mind Bushire is an important stopping place of main air route from Europe to India, and expenditure on workshops there will thus serve a double object. Workshop lorries, could probably even now reach Shiraz from Kasvin via Tehran and Ispahan with a little work, and it is within my personal knowledge the construction of roads, fit for motors from Shiraz to most of principal points in Fars would involve little difficulty or expense." 4. I added that I had seen a good deal during the past ten years of the limitations of troops in Persia, and had practical experience of the use of aeroplanes for police purposes in Mesopotamia and West Persia. Experience shows that effective discrimination can be exercised, and there is less risk of complications on the way to and from the scene of action, and greater moral effect. The attitude of tribes is: “We are not afraid of your troops. Guns cannot reach us: but we cannot fight against your aircraft.” In point of fact the advent of the aeroplanes and their active participation
against the tribes had an important and in my opinion determining effect on the position, and within six weeks from their arrival (I speak from memory) opposition to our troops was at an end. 5. A complete chain of landing grounds has been made under my orders from Baghdad to the Indian frontier, extending all down the northern shore of the Gulf; landing grounds have also been made on the Bushire-Shiraz road. A motor road from Bundar Abbas to Shiraz is under construction, and, if completed, will make it possible to maintain an aerodrome there. Aeroplanes could then co-operate with local levies, disperse hostile gatherings, and generally assist the Persian Government to maintain order at a far less cost and with less military and political liability than troops. This point of view has been specifically endorsed by Sir P. Cox, His Majesty's Minister, Tehran. 6. There are now only two machines at Bushire, and those of an unsuitable type. 7. I submit that a flight of aeroplanes should be kept at Bushire in the winter, and at Shiraz in the summer. If this was done the withdrawal of our military forces —so urgently desired by the Government of India and so necessary on political and financial grounds - would then be possible except for a small garrison on pre-war lines, viz., one regiment. Troubles will no doubt recur, but they should not be so serious as again to demand our armed intervention; the shortage of ammunition in native hands is acute, and if the arms traffic can be controlled we should have less trouble in the future than in the past. 28 June 1919 THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES Junkers Flugzeug- und Motorenwerke AG was founded in 1895 in Dessau. The company started aircraft production during the First World War. The Treaty of Versailles imposed severe restrictions on Germany’s aircraft industry: Treaty of Versailles Section III. Air Clauses Article 198 The armed forces of Germany must not include any military or naval air forces. Germany may, during a period not extending beyond 1 October 1919, maintain a maximum number of one hundred seaplanes or flying boats, which shall be exclusively employed in searching for submarine mines, shall be furnished with the necessary equipment for this purpose, and shall in no case carry arms, munitions or bombs of any nature whatever. In addition to the engines installed in the seaplanes or flying boats above mentioned, one spare engine may be provided for each engine of each of these craft. No dirigible shall be kept. Article 199 Within two months from the coming into force of the present Treaty the personnel of air forces on the rolls of the German land and sea forces shall be demobilised. Up to 1 October 1919, however, Germany may keep and maintain a total number of one thousand men, including officers, for the whole of the cadres and personnel, flying and nonflying, of all formations and establishments. Article 200 Until the complete evacuation of German territory by the Allied and Associated troops, the aircraft of the Allied and Associated Powers shall enjoy in Germany freedom of passage through the air, freedom of transit and of landing. Article 201 During the six months following the coming into force of the present Treaty, the manufacture and importation of aircraft, parts of aircraft, engines for aircraft, and parts of engines for aircraft, shall be forbidden in all German territory. Article 202
On the coming into force of the present Treaty, all military and naval aeronautical material, except the machines mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of Article 198, must be delivered to the Governments of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. Delivery must be effected at such places as the said Governments may select, and must be completed within three months. In particular, this material will include all items under the following heads which are or have been in use or were designed for warlike purposes: Complete aeroplanes and seaplanes, as well as those being manufactured, repaired or assembled. Dirigibles able to take the air, being manufactured, repaired or assembled. Plant for the manufacture of hydrogen. Dirigible sheds and shelters of every kind for aircraft. Pending their delivery, dirigibles will, at the expense of Germany, be maintained inflated with hydrogen; the plant for the manufacture of hydrogen, as well as the sheds for dirigibles may at the discretion of the said Powers, be left to Germany until the time when the dirigibles are handed over. Engines for aircraft. Nacelles and fuselages. Armament (guns, machine guns, light machine guns, bomb-dropping apparatus, torpedo-dropping apparatus, synchronisation apparatus, aiming apparatus). Munitions (cartridges, shells, bombs loaded or unloaded, stocks of explosives or of material for their manufacture). Instruments for use on aircraft. Wireless apparatus and photographic or cinematograph apparatus for use on aircraft. Component parts of any of the items under the preceding heads. The material referred to above shall not be removed without special permission from the said Governments. 10 July 1919 “Flight” reports – “According to a message from Paris, the French Chamber will vote additional credits for the establishment of an Aviation Mission in Turkey, entrusted with the organisation of the following postal lines: Constantinople, Smyrna, Grecian Archipelago; Constantinople, Palestine, Messa, Egypt, Constantinople, Armenia, Caucasus, Persia, Bucharest, South Russia; Constantinople, Salonika, the Balkans. It is stated that these lines will be carried on by the military until French air navigation companies have been floated.” 27 August 1919 War Cabinet. Proposed establishment of an Ariel route from Cairo to Karachi. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War and Air: “The air council have recently had under consideration the necessity for the early establishment of strategic air routes throughout the empire. Of such roots the most important at the present juncture alike on political and military grounds is the route between Egypt and India, via Mesopotamia a preliminary survey of which has already been made in the course of the two successful flights to India accomplished some months since. These flights however were of a pioneer, experimental nature, and, if the route is to be made permanently available for the movements of aircraft on a large-scale, it is essential that the construction of certain works at the more important stations should be undertaken forthwith. The proposed expenditure of £100,000 for these purposes has been the subject of correspondence between the Air Ministry and the Treasury who think that a decision of the War Cabinet should first be obtained on the question of the strength to be maintained in the East as part of the defences of Egypt, Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia and India. The Treasury further suggest that before any work of
construction is undertaken the question of the incidence of cost as between the various governments concerned should be taken up with the India Office and Foreign Office. A copy of the last letter received from the treasury is appended to this memorandum. I would strongly deprecate any proposal to delay the preparation of the air route from Cairo to Karachi for either of the reasons suggested by the Treasury. It is not yet practicable to determine the permanent establishment of the Royal Air Force in India or the Middle East; and though the question of the incidence of cost as between the British and Indian Government in respect of the maintenance of Royal Air Force establishment in India has been under discussion with the India Office, some considerable time must still pass before a definite basis of contribution can be arrived at. The cabinet will appreciate that in view of the present political situation in the Middle East the presence of a strong mobile air force at points of strategic importance is essential. It is no less essential that the Royal Air Force should be in a position to effect at any moment a rapid concentration for purposes of an aerial offensive or to dispatch reinforcements drawn from all available reserves at the shortest notice to one or other of the disturbed areas. This can only be effected by the establishment of a well-defined route with stations at intervals where there are adequate facilities for refuelling and for effecting repairs. To this end the Air Ministry propose to organise the Cairo-Basra-Karachi route on the lines shown in the ensuing paragraphs of this memorandum. The route, of which a map is attached for reference, will embrace the following landing grounds, intermediate landing grounds for refuelling purposes, and emergency landing grounds: Cairo Main Landing Ground Ramleh Emergency Landing Ground Damascus Intermediate Landing Ground Tadmor Emergency Landing Ground Abukemal (Euphrates) Emergency Landing Ground Hit Emergency Landing Ground Ramadieh Emergency Landing Ground Baghdad Intermediate Landing Ground Sheiksaid (near Kut) Emergency Landing Ground Amara Emergency Landing Ground Basra Main Landing Ground Bushire )Persian Bundarabbas)Gulf. Intermediate Landing Ground Charbar ) To provide the buildings essential for the inauguration of this route an expenditure of approximately £100,000 will be necessary. This will be absorbed as follows:- Cairo £10,000 Basra £33,000 Karachi £51,000 4 Intermediate Stations £7,000 (£1,500 a piece) (Expenditure at Damascus not included for reasons in para. below). It is anticipated that no expenditure will be required in respect of the emergency landing grounds showing above other than a nominal sum to be paid the local sheikh on condition of his maintaining the ground in order and properly marked. It should not (sic) be noted that of the total of £100,000 no less a sum than £94,000 is to be spent on the erection of permanent works at Cairo, Basra, and Karachi. The maintenance of these three stations, in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India, respectively, and, as a consequence, the provision of adequate aerodrome accommodation, is in any case imperative on strategic grounds, and for the normal supply of machines to the East, irrespective of the needs of a service such as that in contemplation between Cairo and Karachi. This estimate of £100,000 is not intended to represent the total expenditure which may ultimately be incurred but is to be regarded as the minimum which will enable machines to be sent to India by air. If it is decided permanently to maintain a larger force of aircraft at any one of these three stations than is necessary for maintaining
regular communications by air, it is clear that a further considerable outlay will be involved. Again, incidental expenditure such as may be incurred for the erection of meteorological and wireless stations is not covered by this estimate. The Air Council's original proposal to the Treasury also contemplated the organisation of a regular aerial service for Cairo to Karachi for the carriage of urgent official communications, and passengers on official duty. In deference to the objection expressed by the Treasury they are prepared to postpone for the present the question of the organisation of such a service though they would desire to make it clear that the route is one which contains great possibilities for aviation in its civil and commercial aspects. Even without the establishment of a regular service, there would in any case be a considerable amount of air traffic over the route in connection with the maintenance of the squadrons in the Middle and Far East owing to the necessity of familiarising their personnel with climatic and other conditions of long-distance flying. The inception of this route will further make possible a more accurate survey of its intermediate stages, thereby facilitating any subsequent strategic movements of aircraft on a large-scale, and in the light of the experience already acquired in Mesopotamia it is clear that will effectively assist in the maintenance of public order in the Middle East. The route as planned provides for the laying out of an aerodrome at Damascus and of an emergency landing ground at Tadmore. The future status of the territory in which these places are situated has not yet been decided, but it appears probable that they may be under the mandatory power of France. It is not anticipated that insuperable difficulties would arise in obtaining the right of passage for British military aircraft through territory under French mandate. If however such should prove to be the case it will be possible to divert the route to the South and by using machines of greater endurance to avoid passing over French soil; and it is accordingly not proposed at present to incur any fresh expenditure to Damascus and Tadmore. (See alternative routes as shown on map by dotted lines). On the grounds above stated I request that the war cabinet will authorise the initial expenditure of £100,000 for the works required. This memorandum has been referred to the foreign Office, and India, who have intimated that they have no objection to its submission to the cabinet.”
13 October 1919 7 November 1919 Etienne Poulet and Jean Benoist left Paris on 12 October 1919 in the biplane Caudron. On 7 and 8 November 1919 they stayed overnight at Bandar Abbas. They carried a few cards and covers from Bandar Abbas (9 pieces of mail) and
Charbar (arrived 9 November 1919; small mail collected of which 8 bore Indian adhesives) to Karachi (where a cds of 11 November 1919 was applied). A three-line cachet was applied “PAR POSTE D’AIR/ PAR FAVEUR DE/ M POULET” ; also a two-line cachet « BYAERIAL POST THRO/M.POULET » <Jain, London Philatelist, September 2015> The route was Issy-Les, Molineaux Paris – Frejus – Pisedome – Rome – Naples – Avlona – Sanstephano – Constantinople – Konia – Baghdad – Bushire – Bandar Abbas – Gwador – Chahbar – Karachi – Nasirabad – Delhi – Allahabad – Calcutta (25 November 1919) – Akyab – Rangoon – Moulmein. 23 November 1919 During the England-Australia Air Race, Ross and Keith Smith, with mechanics Jim Bennett and Wally Shiers, on 23 November 1919, arrived at Bandar Abbas where at least one cover was picked up, for onward transmission to Victoria Australia. <Jain, London Philatelist, September 2015> They flew Vickers Vimy G-EAOU (known as “God ‘Elp All Of Us”). http://www.airwaysmuseum.com/Vickers%20Vimy%20G-EAOU.htm November 23.—Left Basra 6.30; perfect day, beautiful sunrise. Flew over Bushire along coast Persian Gulf, landed Bunder Abbas 2.20. Nearly eight hours in the air; machine never faltered. Persian coast very rough and barren. Passed several R.A.F. emergency grounds. Welcomed here (Bunder Abbas) by British Consul, the O.C. troops, and the local Persian Governor. Great interest manifested by local inhabitants; some had never seen an aeroplane. Hope to reach Karachi to-morrow if wind favourable, otherwise Charbar. <Diary of Captain Ross-Smith in “Flight”> 1920 26 February 1920 “Flight” reports – “As one surmised would be the case, the Bolshies are now becoming possessed of regular squadrons of aeroplanes, and in the Askhabad area, on the northern frontier of Persia, some of these are getting pretty busy. Amongst other purposes the planes are being used for distributing propaganda literature amongst the ‘‘heathen”.” 2 March 1920 On the Rome-Tokyo flight the pilot Lieutenant Ferrarin carried a small mail from Bandar Abbas (29 February 1920) and Charbar, arriving at Karachi on 3 March 1920. Also flying from Rome to Tokyo were Captain Masiero who carried a small mail from Bandar Abbas (2 March 1920) arriving at Karachi on 3 March 1920; and Captain Ranza who carried a small mail from Charbar (19 April 1920) arriving at Karachi on 21 April 1920. 4 March 1920 “Flight” reports - “Capt. MATTHEWS on his Sopwith ‘Wallaby’ arrived at Karachi on March 4 at 4.50 p.m., having flown from Jask, Gulf of Oman, Persia, whence he started at 7.45 a.m. It had been necessary to fly as slowly as possible as the propeller was in a shaky condition.”
7 March 1920 On 8 January 1920 De Havilland DH9 G-EAQM piloted by Lieutenants Raymond Parer AFC and John McIntosh left Hounslow England for Australia. They carried a very small mail (3 known) from Charbar (7 March 1920) to Karachi (8 March 1920). The route was Hounslow – Naples – Brindisi – Sudabay – Baghdad – Basra – Bushire – Bandar Abbas – Chahbar – Karachi – Calcutta – Rangoon – Moulmein (crash on 2 April 1920) – Darwin (arrived 2 August 1920). 15 April 1920 The SECRETARY of STATE for WAR (Mr. Churchill): It is estimated by the Air Ministry that there are now in Germany 15,248 aeroplanes, which could in a comparatively short time be made available, and which would be capable of being used for war purposes. Under Article 198 of the Peace Treaty the armed forces of Germany may not include any military or naval air forces. All aeroplanes in Germany are now in process of being listed, and will be inspected by the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control, which is the final authority for deciding which aeroplanes come under the heading of military and naval aeroplanes. All military and naval aeroplanes will then be taken over by the Inter-Allied Aeronautical Commission of Control. <HC Deb 15 April 1920 vol 127 cc1821-3> 26 August 1920 On August 26, reports The Times correspondent at Teheran, British aeroplanes from Kasvin, after several days of enforced inactivity owing to cloudy weather, made a successful bomb raid on Enzeli Harbour, two direct hits on oil boats being observed. It was observed that the shipping in the harbour had increased, but whether the Azerbaijan Republic was determined to continue reinforcing or was endeavouring to evacuate the troops and stores was not clear. 29 September 1920 Bolshevist seaplanes on September 29 bombed Resht, and one crashed behind the Persian Cossack lines. According to The Times correspondent at Teheran, this machine, which is of an antiquated type, is the first aircraft to have passed into the possession of the Persians.
1921 Mirza Abdul Ali Khan Siddiq al-Saltanah, the Persian ambassador in Washington DC asked whether the United States would supply aircraft to form the nucleus of a Persian Air Force. The request was declined. Following this, similar requests were made of Germany, Russia and France. Since there were no provisions in the budget for purchase of aircraft, H.I.M. Reza Shah Pahlavi (at this time Prime Minister) asked the Iranian people to raise needed funds to purchase these aircraft. Following this request, the people of Gilan and Mazanderan province raised the funds to purchase 2 Junkers F-13 from Germany. The contract was signed, the aircraft were delivered, and were called “Gilan” and “Mazanderan”. Following Germany, Russia agreed to sell aircraft to Iran. Iran purchased DH-4 and DH-9 (built in Russia, called R-1 and R-5) and Avro-504, from Russia (the Russians called it AVROSHKA).These aircraft were delivered in 1923 (1302). At the same time France also agreed to sell aircraft to Iran so IIAF purchased Spad-42, Potez-8, Breguet-14, and Breguet-19 from France. http://www.iiaf.net/iiaf/ “Gilan” and “Mazanderan” 5 May 1921 The “London Ultimatum” imposed a one-year ban on the construction and export of commercial aircraft. First flight of the Junkers F 13 - Junkers 13 October 1921 The Postmaster-General announced that the air mails for Iraq (Mesopotamia) which were dispatched from London on October 13 and 20 reached Baghdad by air from Cairo on October 30. In future, dispatches for onward transmission by the fortnightly Cairo-Baghdad air service will be made from London fortnightly on Thursday evenings, instead of weekly as heretofore. Correspondence included in them for Bushire and for all places in Persia north and west of it, as well as for Iraq, should gain from at least 3 days (Bushire) up to 14 or more days (Baghdad, Isfahan, etc.) in time of transmission. A special air fee of 1s. per ounce is charged in addition to ordinary imperial postage. Each packet should
philatelic-literature.comRkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy MTUzMjY3MA==